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Abdallah Al-Shawabkeh (UAE), Rama Kanungo (UK) 
Credit risk estimate using internal explicit knowledge 
Abstract 
Jordanian banks traditionally use a set of indicators, based on their internal explicit knowledge to examine the credit 
risk caused by default loans of individual borrowers. The banks are reliant on the personal and financial information of 
the borrowers, obtained by knowing them, often referred as internal explicit knowledge. Internal explicit knowledge 
characterizes both financial and non-financial indicators of individual borrowers, such as; loan amount, educational 
level, occupation, income, marital status, age, and gender. The authors studied 2755 default or non-performing personal 
loan profiles obtained from Jordanian Banks over a period of 1999 to 2014. The results show that low earning unem-
ployed borrowers are very likely to default and contribute to non-performing loans by increasing the chances of credit 
risk. In addition, it is found that the unmarried, younger borrowers and moderate loan amount increase the probability 
of non-performing loans. On the contrary, borrowers employed in private sector and at least educated to a degree level 
are most likely to mitigate the credit risk. The study suggests improving the decision making process of Jordanian 
banks by making it more quantitative and dependable, instead of using only subjective or judgemental based under-
standing of borrowers. 
Keywords: credit risk, Jordanian banks, default loans, internal explicit knowledge, logistic analysis. 
JEL Classification: E51, G32, D81, E47. 
Introduction 
Banks develop credit strategy to monitor and 
manage risk associated with default or non-
performing personal and enterprise based 
commercial loans. Typically, banks attempt 
optimizing returns on their loan portfolios, while 
minimizing the credit risk, thus ensuring it falls 
within their specified credit strategy. In particular, 
the credit risk management aims to maximize a 
bank’s risk-adjusted rate of return by maintaining 
credit risk exposure within acceptable parameters 
(Basel, 2013). Credit risk is derived from default 
receivable, where desired cash flow from loans, 
securities and derivatives are unclaimed (Saunders 
and Cornet, 2008). Gup et al. (2007) find credit risk 
precipitated over a period time leading to systemic 
banking failures. The Jordanian banking system 
suffers largely from default or non-performing 
personal loans, causing unmanageable credit risk. 
The amount of default or non-performing personal 
loans of Jordanian banks is much higher compared 
to international and Arabic banks (Central Bank of 
Jordan, 2014). In addition, the default retail loan to 
total loan ratio of Jordanian banks amounts to 11% 
during year 2008-09 (Central Bank of Jordan, 2010) 
compared to the Arab world’s average of 5.65% 
over the same period (IMF, 2016). However, the 
credit risk assessment of Jordanian banks mainly 
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depends on the personal and financial information 
of the individual borrowers, obtained by knowing 
them, often referred as internal explicit knowledge. 
The internal explicit knowledge is the subjective or 
judgemental understanding of their borrowers. 
Typically, Jordanian banks compile a set of 
information and model their credit risk parameters 
based on internal explicit knowledge. 
Several credit risk models, i.e. typically internal 
credit risk models are developed to quantify risk and 
estimate credit risk impacts on capital structure of 
firms (Lopez and Saidenberg, 2000). The main aim 
of managing credit risk is to maximize a bank’s 
risk-adjusted rate of return by keeping credit risk 
exposure within acceptable parameters (Lopez and 
Saidenberg, 2000; Dietsch and Petey, 2002; and 
Poudel, 2012). Particularly, credit risk originates 
from a situation, where a debtor fails to oblige the 
debt and it has a sizable impact on the VAR (Value-
at-Risk) estimates of the banks. Typically, 
commercial banks face with credit risk issue, and 
retail loans are the largest and most obvious source 
of this type of risk (Al-Tamimi and AL-Mazrooei, 
2007; Goyal and Joshi, 2012). Credit risk provisions 
are reflected by the banks’ capital adequacy ratio, 
where almost 70% of capital is allocated for credit 
risk and the rest for market adjusted risk 
(Bhattacharya and Sinha Roy, 2008). Over the last 
decade, a number of international banks have 
developed sophisticated assessment systems in an 
attempt to model credit risk. The focus of such 
models is to aid decision makers in banks to 
quantify and manage risk efficiently. The output of 
these models play increasingly important role in 
banks’ risk measurement and performance 
management process, such as customer profitability 
analysis, and risk-based pricing (Crouhy et al., 
2000; Campbell, 2007). 
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In this study, we employ a unique set of variables 
based on banks’ internal explicit knowledge to 
examine credit risk based on default personal loans 
of Jordanian banks. Several prior studies (see 
Altman and Saunders, 1998) have used different 
methods and credit risk indicators of banks, i.e. net 
loans, bad debt provision, interest coverage, 
suspended interest, gross loan, and bad loans etc. or 
a combination of these measures with non-financial 
items. However, the credit strategy of Jordanian 
banks depends on the internal explicit knowledge of 
their borrowers. Thus, we use a set of parameters 
(variables) consistent with the measures, used by the 
Jordanian banks, such as loan amount, educational 
level, occupation, marital status, age, and gender of 
borrowers to examine the risk of default and to what 
extent they affect the probability of credit risk? 
Previous works by Zorn and Lea (1989); Quercia 
and Stegman (1992); Hsieh (2004); and Xu and 
Walton (2005) have used broadly similar measures 
in their studies. We explore by using internal 
implicit knowledge of Jordanian banks in assessing 
probability of default or non-performing personal 
loans and their subsequent implications. In addition, 
we investigate to what extent variables such as loan 
amount, bank’s location and a combination of 
customer-bank-age affect the risk of default.  
This study offers a novel perspective to credit risk 
literature within the Asia-Pacific and Middle-
Eastern regions since risk measures used in our 
analysis are subjective; whereas, other studies have 
mainly used conventional accounting and/or 
financial measures of risk. In addition, it advances a 
quantitative specification to evaluate the chances of 
default by non-performing personal loans, thus 
captures the extent of credit risk posed by the 
borrowers. The findings of this study could aid to 
the decision support system of banks, those are 
heavily reliant on personal information of 
borrowers. Moreover, by comparing other 
commonly used credit risk models with our model, 
our study provides a clear understanding of model 
utility in terms of classificatory accuracy and 
robustness. 
1. Methods of predicting credit risk  
Several credit risk evaluation systems are based on 
some form of the judgemental-based system, which 
makes quantifying risk a big challenge (Fensters-
tock, 2005; Cheng and Neamtiu, 2009). Jordanian 
banks emphasize on subjective measures to assess 
personal loans, thus they become over reliant on 
their internal knowledge of customers. Typically, in 
a well-built financial system, risk management is on 
the downstream and risk prediction is on the up-
stream (Yeh and Lien, 2009). However, Jordanian 
banks lack a consistent approach to manage credit 
risk, thus fail to predict the credit risk and incur large 
default or non-performing personal loans. To build a 
credit scoring model, it is critical that there is a portfo-
lio of large sample of previous customers with their 
application details, behavioral patterns, and subsequent 
credit history (Jarrow, 2001; Ong et al., 2005). Credit 
scoring is a set of decision models, and their underly-
ing techniques facilitate decision making process for 
granting the loans. These techniques decide who will 
get credit, how much credit should borrowers get, and 
what operational strategies will improve the profitabili-
ty of the banks (Altman et al., 2006).   
The risk of default estimation has been improved by 
credit scoring models by including other aspects of 
credit risk management at the pre-application stage 
(identification of potential borrowers), at the appli-
cation stage (identification of acceptable borrowers), 
and at the performance stage (identification of poss-
ible behavioral patterns of existing borrowers) (Bak-
shi et al., 2001). An earlier Basel’s report (2004) 
stipulates two approaches of estimating the risk of 
default, one is conditional, and another is uncondi-
tional (see Table 1). The revised Basel report (2014) 
almost agrees with these approaches with different 
re-captions only, where unconditional approach is 
now referred as internal-rating based approach, and 
conditional approach is now referred as standardized 
approach. 
Table 1. Approaches of credit risk management 
Approach Example Description 
Unconditional 
approach* 
Unexpected losses 
(UL) approach, 
Credit metrics and 
Credit risk 
These models base EDF** 
(expected default frequency) and 
derived correlation effects on 
relationships between historical 
defaults and borrower-specific 
information, such as internal risk 
ratings. 
Conditional 
approach* 
McKinsey and 
company’s credit 
portfolio view 
The rating transition matrices are 
functionally related to the situation 
of the economy, as the matrices 
are modified to give an increased 
likelihood of an upgrade (and 
decreased likelihood of a down-
grade) during an upswing (down-
swing) in a credit cycle. 
Note:* Under revised Basel report, 2014 the unconditional 
approach is now referred as internal-rating based approach, and 
conditional approach is now referred as standardized approach. 
** Expected Default Frequency represents the probability of 
default within a given time horizon, typically one year. EDF 
analysis is crucial in strengthening risk measures of banks. 
EDFs help banks for their risk, capital and asset management. 
This is a core compliance measure of Basel II and III. 
Practitioners distinguish between conditional mod-
els that attempt to incorporate information on the 
state of the economy, such as levels and trends in do-
mestic and international employment, inflation, stock 
prices and interest rates, and even indicators of the 
financial health of particular sectors, and unconditional 
models reflect relatively limited borrower or facility-
specific information (Chabane et al., 2004).   
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2. Jordanian banks and credit risk 
The banking and financial intermediary system in 
Jordan, as a whole account for an average 17% of 
Jordan’s GDP. At the end of 2014, there were 25 
banks operating in Jordan: 13 national commercial 
banks, 8 foreign and 4 Islamic banks (Central Bank 
of Jordan, 2014). The banking system in Jordan has 
JOD (Jordanian Dollars) 17.8 billion in assets and a 
vast network of branches covering about 11,900 
persons per branch on an average. However, the 
three largest banks account almost for 55% of the 
total assets, i.e. the Arab Bank dominating the sector 
with 29% of all assets, the Housing Bank as the 
second largest with the most extensive branch net-
work, and the Jordan National Bank is the third 
(Central Bank of Jordan, 2014). Overall, Jordan’s 
banking system is privately owned, well-developed, 
profitable and efficient, and its banks are advanced 
in comparison with the other banks in the region 
(Siam, 2007). Despite this relatively high level of 
development for this region, the need for more fi-
nancial development is still obvious throughout the 
Jordanian economy (Richard, 2003). The funds in 
Jordanian banks are mainly used to grant loans for 
the private and public sectors. In addition, they de-
posit with national and international banks, and 
invest in institutional stocks and governments 
bonds. The rate of loans and advances to total credit 
facilities increased from 59.6% in 2008 to 86.1% by 
the end of 2014 (Central Bank of Jordan, 2014). 
Although Jordanian banks are relatively healthy 
organizations, they operate profitably, but they need 
to manage risk more efficiently (Siam, 2007). While 
the international average for default rates for retail 
loans is lower than 5-6% (Central Bank of Jordan, 
2008, 2010), in Jordan default retail loans are esti-
mated to be in the region of 11% compared to the 
Arab world’s average of 5.65% during 2008-2009 
(IMF, 2016). Jordanian banks are not effective lend-
ers since their percentage of bad loans to gross loans 
is exceedingly high. This suggests the critical prob-
lem Jordanian banks are experiencing and their need 
for finding effective solutions to reduce the rate of 
defaults. Particularly, they require a robust and con-
sistent framework that, in effect can manage their 
credit risk sufficiently.  
Jordanian banks lack formalized knowledge for 
developing knowledge-based decision support sys-
tems to help with managing credit risk (Mashhour 
and Zaatreh, 2008). Siam (2007) finds banks in Jor-
dan face uncontrollable loans due to mismanage-
ment, flawed lending policy and illegal manipula-
tion in lending, mainly based on their personalized 
knowledge of the customers. Most of the problems, 
in fact, are internal to the banks themselves. In 
2007, the Financial Market International (FMI) 
found that Jordanian banks are not effective lend-
ers. In particular, Jordanian banks lend on the 
basis of personal relationships and only in some 
cases on collateralization. Moreover, credit officers 
in Jordanian banks evaluate credit risk subjectively 
(Ministry of Planning and International Coopera-
tion, 2007). 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1. Data. To create our dataset, we included all 
banks operating in Jordan during our sample period 
from 1999 to 2014. Altogether, there are 25 banks 
listed under the directory of Central Bank of Jordan 
(CBJ, 2014). At first, 8 banks are excluded from the 
dataset, since they have either full or majority of 
foreign ownership stake. In addition, 4 other banks 
are further eliminated due to missing and unavaila-
bility of data, as they are primarily Islamic banks or 
branches of Islamic banks. Hence, the final number 
resulted in 13 banks. Next, we identified a sample of 
2755 default or non-performing loan profiles of 
individual borrowers from these 13 banks. The loan 
profiles of individual borrowers are privately col-
lected from each bank under data protection guide-
lines, where each individual profile is strictly ano-
nymized. The loan profiles of individuals are deter-
mined based on five criteria. The criteria are laid out 
as- 1) at least three consecutive monthly arrears1 or 
five arrears over two years from the beginning of 
loan period, 2) at least two formal notices of late 
payment are served over two years, 3) no satisfacto-
ry payment plan is proposedby the borrowers to 
consider a repayment plan, 4) the non-payment loan 
amount is less than 2/3 of the collateral, if applica-
ble, 5) after relaxing the repayment dates, the sche-
duled payments are not complied with. To estimate 
our model, we create a matched sample of 2755 
performing loan profiles of individual borrowers 
from these 13 banks. Based on above 5 criteria, the 
performing borrowers have maintained timely re-
payment and not violated any terms and conditions, 
as stipulated by the contractual agreement from the 
beginning of the loan period. The variables selected 
under performing loan profile exactly match with 
the default or non-performing loan profile variables. 
The sample of loan profiles includes several finan-
cial and non-financial variables of the banks, those 
are used mainly for the assessment of loan provision 
in Jordanian Banks. The variables are compiled by 
the banks through knowing the customers at person-
al level, often known as internal explicit knowledge. 
Table 2 describes the variable definitions. The de-
pendant variable is ‘Perform (PERF)’, which indi-
cates a satisfactory or unsatisfactory record of re-
                                                     
1 As subject to loan terms and conditions, i.e. only interest payment, 
and/or interest with principal. 
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payments on a loan. This variable is a binary choice 
unobservable predictor, i.e. 0 indicates ‘default or 
non-performing loans’ and 1 indicates ‘performing 
loans’. Hence, PERF captures the probability of 
credit risk arising from default personal loans. The 
potential risk measures are explanatory or indepen-
dent variables (based on internal explicit know-
ledge) and divided into two groups. The group one 
includes non-financial variables, i.e. occupation, 
educational level, marital status, age and gender. 
The other group includes a combination of bank 
specific financial and non-financial variables, i.e. 
loan amount, bank’s location and customer-bank-
age. The selection of variables included in this study 
is mainly based on Jordanian banks’ choice of 
measures for credit risk assessment posed by per-
sonal lending.  
Table 2. Credit risk variable description 
Variable Description 
PERF 
Represents a binary choice latent variable, stands for the 
borrowers’ loan payment. Where 0 denotes default or non-
performing loan and 1 indicates performing loan.  
OCC 
OCC denotes the occupation of the borrowers, where; 1 
represents ‘Unemployed or others’, 2 represents 'Governmental 
or Public sector employees', 3 represents ‘Private or General 
Management and administrative employees’. 
CBA 
CBA stands for the amount of time in years the borrowers have 
been with the bank. CBA denotes 1 for equal to or less than 2 
years, 2 for two years to five years, and 3 for more than five 
years. 
INC 
INC is the monthly income of the borrowers in Jordanian Dinar, 
where; low income group stands for 1 (200-999 JD), mid income 
group represents 2(1000-1999 JD) and high income group 
represents 3 (≥ 2000 JD). 
AGE 
AGE denotes the age of the borrowers in years. AGE is 
represented by 1 for the younger group (19-30 years), 2 for 
middle group (31-59 years), and 3 for senior group (≥ 60 years).  
EDU 
EDU is the level of educational qualification achieved by the 
borrowers, denotes as 1 for undergraduate/degree, 2 for post-
graduate/masters and above, and 3 for other qualifications.   
LAM 
LAM is the loan amount that the borrowers have taken, denotes 
as low amount for 1 (≤ 10,000 JD), mid amount for 2(10,001-
99,000 JD), and high amount for 3(≥100,000 JD).  
MAR 
MAR denotes the marital status of the borrowers, 1 if married 
and 0 otherwise.  
GND 
GND represents the gender of the borrowers, denotes 1 for male 
and 0 for female. 
3.2. Variable description. Each variable is assigned 
scale values based on their different levels. There-
fore, each attribute variable is converted into dum-
my variables. OCC denotes the occupation of the 
borrowers, where; 1 represents ‘Unemployed or 
others’, 2 represents ‘Governmental or Public sector 
employees’, 3 represents ‘Private or General Man-
agement and administrative employees’. CBA 
stands for the amount of time in years the borrowers 
have been with the bank. CBA denotes 1 for equal 
to or less than 2 years, 2 for two years to five years, 
and 3 for more than five years. INC is the monthly 
income of the borrowers in Jordanian Dinar, where; 
low income group stands for 1 (200-999 JD), mid 
income group represents 2 (1000-1999 JD) and high 
income group represents 3 (≥ 2000 JD). AGE de-
notes the age of the borrowers in years. AGE is 
represented by 1 for the younger group (19-30 
years), 2 for middle group (31-59 years) and 3 for 
senior group (≥ 60 years). EDU is the level of edu-
cational qualification achieved by the borrowers, 
denotes as 1 for undergraduate/degree, 2 for post-
graduate/masters and above, and 3 for other qualifi-
cations. LAM is the loan amount that the borrowers 
have taken, denotes as low amount for 1 (≤ 10,000 
JD), mid amount for 2 (10,001-99,000 JD), and high 
amount for 3 (≥ 100,000 JD). MAR denotes the 
marital status of the borrowers, 1 if married and 0 
otherwise. GND represents the gender of the bor-
rowers, denotes 1 for male and 0 for female. Based 
on their scale value, we have created dummy va-
riables for each level to run in the logistic model. 
Although, multicollinearity can be a pertinent issue 
with several dummy variables, but can be safely 
ignored, when the attribute variable is categorical 
and having multi-level values.  
3.3. Methodology. We estimate a binary choice 
logistic model to capture the credit risk of Jordanian 
banks. The credit risk is specified as a proxy for the 
default loans 2 . For example, when the loans are 
defaulted over time (default or non-performing loan 
criteria are outlined in the above data section), the 
credit risk becomes higher. We examine the same 
variables used by Jordanian banks to measure the 
credit risk compiled by banks’ internal explicit 
knowledge, i.e. knowing the borrowers through their 
personal knowledge. Our default or non-performing 
loan and performing loan profile variables are used 
in the logistic model in one run. We construct the 
generic logistic model as follows:  *, 0 1 , 2 , 3 ,
4 , 5 , 6 , 7 ,
8 , ,
i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t
i t
Y OCC CAS INC
AGE EDU LAM MAR
GND
        
             (1) 
where  *,tiY  is a binary choice latent variable, de-
fined as the observable 0, 1; where 0 indicates ‘de-
fault or non-performing loan’ and 1 indicates ‘per-
forming loan’.  *,tiY  gives the logistic transforma-
tion with the log-odds )1
( Ln . A positive and 
significant value of any variable coefficient indi-
cates that the variable significantly contributes to 
the credit risk. In addition, we supplemented our 
analysis by comparing the logistic estimate with 
alternate models, commonly used for credit risk 
analysis. We aim to find if any other alternate model 
                                                     
2 Basel Committee recommendation, 2010 and 2014. 
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could offer better results by improving the credit 
risk prediction. West (2000) and Ong et al. (2005) 
find that with an improvement even to a fraction of 
a percentage in credit accuracy leads to significant 
savings for the banks. 
We expect that borrowers without a job are more 
likely to default, while for the variable income, we 
predict that borrowers with higher income would 
have lower probability of default. Hayashi (1987) 
observes that borrowers with low income are more 
likely to default. For the variable marital status 
(MAR), we predict that unmarried couples would be 
more likely to default, compared to married couples. 
Quercia and Stegman (1992) find that unmarried or 
divorced borrowers are more likely to default than 
married ones. We also expect educated customers 
would have lower probability of default. Chatterjee 
et al. (2007) find that uneducated and unskilled bor-
rowers are at a high level of risk. For the variable 
age (AGE), we expect that younger clients would 
have higher probability of default. For both the va-
riables loan amount (LAM) and customer-bank-age 
(CBA), we suppose lower loan amount and new bor-
rowers are less likely to default. In particular, under 
customer-bank-age (CBA), new customer would have 
lower probability of risk, whereas customers longer 
with the bank are more likely to default. 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Robustness test. As an initial robustness check, 
we ran all the explanatory variables under logistic 
regression and deleted the outliers, those have re-
ported Studentized residuals larger than ± 3. Pres-
ence of outliers can potentially limit the chances of 
model accuracy and lead to biased coefficient esti-
mation (Christensen, 1997). In addition, we checked 
all the diagnostics of our model. The Hosmer and 
Lemeshow test was not significant suggesting our 
model is reliable. Also, we found that the Omnibus 
statistic is significant, indicating a parsimonious mod-
el. However, to ascertain any unobservable estimation 
issue, we conducted further robustness check. There-
fore, we used Bianco and Yohai’s (1996) robust logis-
tic regression, introduced by Croux and Haesbroeck 
(2003) to evaluate the classification accuracy and 
robustness of model. The robust logistic regression 
includes a bounded function and a bias correction 
term to produce a higher model classification. Con-
trasting both the models we found that the results do 
not differ at statistical level, as we obtained same p-
values for our explanatory variables with consistent 
statistical significance. The only difference observed 
was the reduction in the value of standard errors.  
However, the difference was relatively marginal. 
This suggested that the corresponding Wald z statis-
tics of the variables are not going to be changed 
much to derive a different interpretation of results. 
This leads to consider our model specification is 
robust and goodness-of-fit measure is satisfied.  
4.2. Summary statistics. Table 3 presents the de-
scriptive statistics for both the default or non-
performing loan and the performing loan profiles. 
All the variables in the sample are recorded as scale 
variables; therefore, the mean and median values are 
not reported, while frequency distribution and per-
centages are reported.  
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of the credit risk variables 
Variable Description Code 
Panel 1 Panel 2 
Default or non-performing loan Performing loan 
Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
OCC Occupation 
1 171 6.21% 23 0.83% 
2 1432 51.98% 1489 54.05% 
3 1152 41.81% 1243 45.12% 
CBA Customer-bank-age 
1 1645 59.71% 987 35.83% 
2 765 27.77% 1121 40.69% 
3 345 12.52% 647 23.48% 
INC Income 
1 675 24.50% 476 17.28% 
2 1757 63.77% 1311 47.59% 
3 323 11.72% 968 35.14% 
AGE Age 
1 1084 39.35% 659 23.91% 
2 976 35.43% 1409 51.14% 
3 695 25.23% 687 24.94% 
EDU Educational level 
1 967 35.10% 798 28.97% 
2 766 27.80% 932 33.83% 
3 1022 37.10% 1025 37.21% 
LAM Loan-amount 
1 1222 44.36% 1432 51.98% 
2 989 35.90% 1126 40.87% 
3 544 19.75% 197 7.15% 
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Table 3 (cont.). Descriptive statistics of the credit risk variables 
Variable Description Code 
Panel 1 Panel 2 
Default or non-performing loan Performing loan 
Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
MAR Marital status 
1 1881 68.30% 1902 69.04% 
0 874 31.70% 853 30.96% 
GND Gender 
1 2354 85.40% 2451 88.97% 
0 401 14.60% 304 11.03% 
Note: A total number of 2755 default or non-performing loan profiles and 2755 matched performing loan profiles are included in the 
descriptive statistics. OCC denotes the occupation of the borrowers, where; 1 represents ‘Unemployed or others’, 2 represents ‘Go-
vernmental or Public sector employees’, 3 represents ‘Private or General Management and administrative employees’. CBA stands 
for the amount of time in years the borrowers have been with the bank. CBA denotes 1 for equal to or less than 2 years, 2 for two 
years to five years, and 3 for more than five years. INC is the monthly income of the borrowers in Jordanian Dinar, where; low 
income group stands for 1 (200-999 JD), mid income group represents 2 (1000-1999 JD), and high income group represents 3 (≥ 
2000 JD). AGE denotes the age of the borrowers in years. AGE is represented by 1 for the younger group (19-30 years), 2 for mid-
dle group (31-59 years) and 3 for senior group (≥ 60 years). EDU is the level of educational qualification achieved by the borrowers, 
denotes as 1 for undergraduate/degree, 2 for post-graduate/masters and above, and 3 for other qualifications. LAM is the loan 
amount that the borrowers have taken, denotes as low amount for 1 (≤ 10,000 JD), mid amount for 2 (10,001-99,000 JD), and high 
amount for 3 (≥ 100,000 JD). MAR denotes the marital status of the borrowers, 1 if married and 0 otherwise. GND represents the 
gender of the borrowers, denotes 1 for male and 0 for female. 
Under occupation (OCC), the largest group is the 
government or public sector employees representing 
51.98% and 54.05% respectively for both the loan 
profiles. It is interesting that the number of unem-
ployed borrowers largely differ between both the 
loan profiles. There are 6.21% unemployed within 
default or non-performing loan profile, while a mar-
ginal 0.83% unemployed under performing loan. 
The amount of time a borrower has been with a 
bank (CBA) indicates that the majority of default 
borrowers are banking with their banks almost less 
than 2 years. However, performing loan profile sug-
gests that 40.69% borrowers are with the bank be-
tween 2 to 5 years. The smallest group of borrowers 
under both the loan profiles are with the bank for 
more than 5 years. For the income (INC) variable, 
most of the borrowers earn between 1000 to 1999 
JD per month, whereas; the high income group, i.e. 
more than 2000 JD per month represents 35.14% of 
the total performing loan profile and only 11.72% of 
the default or non-performing loan. The low income 
group, i.e. borrowers earning less than 999 JD per 
month represents 24.50% of default loan profile and 
17.28% of performing loan profile. 
The age (AGE) of borrower for the default loan 
profile shows that 39.35% of borrowers’ age falls 
below 30 years; while for the performing loan, 
23.91% of borrowers are below 30 years. The larg-
est age group, i.e. 51.14% for performing loan is 
between 31 to 59 years. Under educational qualifi-
cation (EDU), most of the borrowers have achieved 
a degree or a master’s qualifications. The loan 
amount variable indicates that 44.36% default loan 
borrowers and 51.98% performing loan borrowers 
have taken loan below 10,000 JD. Interestingly, 
only 7.15% performing loan borrowers compared to 
19.75% default loan borrowers have taken a high 
 
loan amount, equal to or more than 100,000 JD. 
Most of the default and performing borrowers are 
married, and male for both the marital status (MAR) 
and gender (GND) variables. 
4.3. Bivariate correlation. The bivariate correlation 
results are presented in Table 4. Panel 1 reports the 
default or non-performing loan sample results, and 
Panel 2 reports performing loan sample results. 
Most of the variables indicate significant positive 
relationship with exception to a few variables. In-
come (INC), Age (AGE), Education (EDU) and 
Loan amount (LAM) are negatively significant with 
Customer-bank-age (CBA) group for the default or 
non-performing loan profile, whereas; for the per-
forming loan profile only education (EDU) is nega-
tively significant. For both the loan profiles, educa-
tion (EDU) is negatively significant with marital 
status (MAR), suggesting married borrowers are 
more likely to have at least a degree or master’s 
qualification. Marital status (MAR) and gender 
(GND) are negatively significant with loan amount 
(LAM) for the default or non-performing loan pro-
file, indicates that the unmarried or female borrow-
ers are likely to have low income, i.e. below 999 JD 
per month. 
Table 4. Correlation results of credit risk variables 
Panel 1. Default or non-performing loan profile 
 OCC CBA INC AGE EDU LAM MAR 
OCC        
CBA -0.607b       
INC 0.317b -0.219b      
AGE 0.221b -0.349b 0.061b     
EDU 0.162b -0.123b 0.278b 0.009c    
LAM 0.133b -0.115b 0.403b 0.036 0.140b   
MAR 0.049b 0 .152b -0.166b 0.109b -0.096b -0.100b  
GND 0.067b 0.209c -0.121b 0.032b 0.114b 0.021b 0.008b 
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Table 4 (cont.). Correlation results of credit risk 
variables 
Panel 2. Performing loan profile 
 OCC CBA INC AGE EDU LAM MAR 
OCC        
CBA 0.340b       
INC 0.397b 0.562c      
AGE 0.015b 0.202b -0.044a     
EDU 0.183a -0.082b 0.260b 0.260b    
LAM 0.383b 0.044b 0.014b 0.094b 0.179b   
MAR 0.312b 0.307c 0.128b 0.387b -0.102b 0.513b  
GND 0.078C 0.312b -0.665a 0.046b 0.224b 0.023b 0.011b 
Note: A total number of 2755 default or non-performing loan 
profiles and 2755 matched performing loan profiles are in-
cluded in the correlation analysis. OCC denotes the occupation 
of the borrowers, where; 1 represents ‘Unemployed or others’, 2 
represents ‘Governmental or Public sector employees’, 3 
represents ‘Private or General Management and administrative 
employees’. CBA stands for the amount of time in years the 
borrowers have been with the bank. CBA denotes 1 for equal to 
or less than 2 years, 2 for two years to five years, and 3 for more 
than five years. INC is the monthly income of the borrowers in 
Jordanian Dinar, where; low income group stands for 1 (200-
999 JD), mid income group represents 2 (1000-1999 JD), and 
high income group represents 3 (≥ 2000 JD). AGE denotes the 
age of the borrowers in years. AGE is represented by 1 for the 
younger group (19-30 years), 2 for middle group (31-59 years) 
and 3 for senior group (≥ 60 years). EDU is the level of educa-
tional qualification, achieved by the borrowers, denotes as 1 for 
undergraduate/degree, 2 for post-graduate/masters and above, 
and 3 for other qualifications. LAM is the loan amount that the 
borrowers have taken, denotes as low amount for 1 (≤ 10,000 
JD), mid amount for 2 (10,001-99,000 JD), and high amount for 
3 (≥100,000 JD). MAR denotes the marital status of the bor-
rowers, 1 if married and 0 otherwise. GND represents the gend-
er of the borrowers, denotes 1 for male and 0 for female. a Indi-
cates significance at 1% level. b Indicates significance at 5% 
level. c Indicates significance at 10% level. 
4.4. Logistic regression results. Table 5 reports 
logistic regression results. The column 1 represents 
the coefficient estimate, column 2 reports the stan-
dard errors (Std. error), column 3 and 4 represent 
Wald’s statistics and odds ratio ( e ) respectively. 
The model suggests that the explained variance 
among explanatory variables is significantly greater 
than unexplained variance as the Omnibus model 
test is statistically significant at 1% level. The 
choice model performs better with 99.2% classifica-
tory efficiency, than a naive proportional model. 
Most of the explanatory variables measuring the risk 
of default over performing loans are statistically 
significant at 1% level.  
Table 5. Logistic regression results of the credit risk 
variables 
Variable Coefficient Std. error Wald’s 
2  e  (Odds 
ratio) 
Constant 19.926a 3.184 39.157 0.000 
OCC(1) 12.496a 0.956 6.820 2.134 
OCC(2) 5.388 1.617 11.100 0.014 
OCC(3) -5.340a 2.059 6.730 2.005 
CBA(1) 2.298a 1.086 22.331 1.045 
CBA(2) 1.334b 2.008 12.987 0.008 
CBA(3) 2.112b 1.876 8.991 0.277 
INC(1) 19.869a 3.616 30.199 2.255 
INC(2) -7.742a 1.739 19.827 0.002 
INC(3) -4.487a 1.067 17.681 8.812 
AGE(1) 6.360a 1.166 29.762 2.002 
AGE(2) 11.573a 1.820 40.448 1.062 
AGE(3) -2.551a 2.076 11.996 1.011 
EDU(1) -2.551a 2.076 11.996 1.011 
EDU(2) -1.897a 1.339 12.687 2.113 
EDU(3) 2.551 2.076 11.996 1.011 
LAM(1) 0.220a 0.074 8.838 4.803 
LAM(2) -1.177a 0.339 12.095 2.308 
LAM(3) -1.186a 0.216 30.122 0.305 
MAR(1) -0.687a 0.088 60.618 2.503 
MAR(0) 0.968 0.972 34.567 0.088 
GND(1) 1.987a 2.106 18.987 0.045 
GND(0) 2.346 2.456 22.345 0.061 
Diagnostic tests 2    
Omnibus model test 176.89a   
Percentage correctly classified 99.2a   
Cox and Snell R2 0.760   
Note: The table report logistic regression results of credit risk 
variables. The sample includes 2755 default or non-performing 
loans and a matched sample of 2755 performing loans. OCC 
denotes the occupation of the borrowers, where; 1 represents 
‘Unemployed or others’, 2 represents ‘Governmental or Public 
sector employees’, 3 represents ‘Private or General Manage-
ment and administrative employees’. CBA stands for the 
amount of time in years the borrowers have been with the bank. 
CBA denotes 1 for equal to or less than 2 years, 2 for two years 
to five years, and 3 for more than five years. INC is the monthly 
income of the borrowers in Jordanian Dinar, where; low income 
group stands for 1 (200-999 JD), mid income group represents  
2 (1000-1999 JD), and high income group represents 3 (≥ 2000 
JD). AGE denotes the age of the borrowers in years. AGE is 
represented by 1 for the younger group (19-30 years), 2 for 
middle group (31-59 years) and 3 for senior group (≥ 60 years). 
EDU is the level of educational qualification, achieved by the 
borrowers, denotes as 1 for undergraduate/degree, 2 for post-
graduate/masters and above, and 3 for other qualifications.  
LAM is the loan amount that the borrowers have taken, denotes as 
low amount for 1 (≤ 10,000 JD), mid amount for 2 (10,001-99,000 
JD), and high amount for 3 (≥100,000 JD). MAR denotes the ma-
rital status of the borrowers, 1 if married and 0 otherwise. GND 
represents the gender of the borrowers, denotes 1 for male and 0 for 
female. a Indicates significance at 1% level. b Indicates significance 
at 5% level. c Indicates significance at 10% level. 
We find most of the occupation groups are statisti-
cally significant except OCC (2), i.e. government and 
public sector employees. OCC (1) representing unem-
ployed borrowers is positively significant at 1% level 
with an estimated coefficient value of 12.496 and odds 
ratio ( e ) of 2.134. OCC (3) represents private or 
general management and administrative employees, 
which is also significant with a negative coefficient 
value of -5.340 and odds ratio of 2.005. The results 
from occupation suggest that the probability of default 
or non-performing loan increases almost twice, if a 
borrower is unemployed. Similarly, it also indicates 
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that if a borrower is employed in a private or general 
management and administrative sector, then the 
chances of default decrease almost twice. As such 
unemployed borrowers are expected to default, whe-
reas, it is interesting that people in public sector are 
more likely to mitigate the credit risk, given that gov-
ernment and public sector employees do not influence 
the chances of default. The growing trend of private 
sectors in Jordan, as well as the relatively low salary of 
public sector could be the reasons that private sector 
employees are less likely to default, rather they support 
decreasing the chances of credit risk. CBA i.e. the 
number of years the borrowers banking with their 
banks measures significant impact of credit risk (Sau-
rina and Jimenez, 2006). All three levels of CBA are 
positively significant. However, only CBA (1) denotes 
a reported odds ratio ( e ) above 1. The borrowers 
relatively new to a bank, banking less than or equal 
to 2 years are most likely defaulter for non-
performing loans. Since most of the Jordanian banks 
pursue wider initiative for larger customer base fol-
lowing Central Bank of Jordan’s (CBJ) directives 
(2006), it is plausible that banks are recruiting siza-
ble number of new customers and allowing them 
relaxed loan provisions. 
All income (INC) groups are statistically significant, 
however the mid income group INC (2) and high 
income group INC (3) have negative coefficient 
values. The mid income group, i.e. borrowers earn 
1000 to 1999 JD per month, does not demonstrate 
any sizable impact on probability of default, as it re-
ports a marginal odds ratio of 0.002. The low income 
group INC (1), which represents borrowers earning 
less than 999 JD per month, reports an odds ratio of 
2.255, suggesting that borrowers in this group are 
more than twice likely to default. The high income 
group, which denotes borrowers earning more than 
2000 JD per month, are most likely to decrease the 
chances of default almost by 8 times. We find this is 
consistent with our expectation, although the credit 
risk reduction by a margin of 8 times appears exces-
sive. Younger and mid age borrowers represented 
by AGE (1) and AGE (2), are positively significant, 
where the senior group is negatively significant. 
Younger borrowers those are below 30 years of age 
are highly likely to default and their chances of de-
fault increase almost twice. This is consistent with 
the findings of Chatterjee et al. (2007).  
The senior borrowers, on the other hand significant-
ly lower the probability of default.  
EDU (1) i.e. borrowers having a degree qualification 
and EDU, (2) i.e. borrowers having a postgraduate or 
master’s qualification are negatively significant ex-
cluding EDU, (3) i.e. borrowers having other qualifica-
tions, which is statistically insignificant. EDU (2) re-
ports odds ratio ( e ) of 2.113. Thus, the borrowers 
that have achieved a postgraduate or master’s qualifi-
cation are most likely to lower the probability of de-
fault by almost twice. Loan amount (LAM) 
represented by low, mid and high loan amount are 
statistically significant, however high loan amount 
LAM (3) i.e. an amount equal to or more than 100,000 
JD indicates a marginal odds ratio. Borrowers having a 
low loan amount LAM (1) i.e. less than or equal to 
10,000 JD, are most unlikely to default, rather lowers 
the chances of default almost by 4 times. However, the 
mid loan amount LAM (2) i.e. a loan amount between 
10,001 JD to 99,000 JD increases the probability of 
default by almost twice. Since we find high in-
come and mid income group borrowers lower the 
chances of default, it is possible that mid loan 
amounts are manageable by those groups. Whe-
reas, low income group could typically struggle 
with the loan. We find marital status MAR (1) i.e. 
married borrowers is negatively significant with a 
reported odds ratio of 2.503. This suggests married 
borrowers are likely to lower the chances of default 
by almost two and half times. Similarly, gender GND 
(1) i.e. male borrowers is statistically significant, but 
denotes a marginal odds ratio of 0.088.  
5. Supplementary analysis 
To evaluate the best performing model, we ex-
amined by comparing 6 other commonly used credit 
risk models. Different algorithm based models are 
regularly used to predict the risk of default i.e. 
CHAID, QUEST, Decision Tree, C 5.0, Bayesian 
Net, and Neural Network (NN). These models are 
known as decision support models. The models help 
decision makers of banks in granting loans by eva-
luating the chances of credit risk. We present a 
comparative estimate of all the models in Table 6.  
Table 6. Comparison between the commonly used 
credit risk models 
Model 
Type I 
error 
Type II 
error 
F-
score 
PCC PIC Accuracy 
Logistic 
regression 
9.7 0.8 94.3 99.2 89.3 97.9 
CHAID 17.2 4.1 87.4 95.7 79.1 93.9 
QUEST 6.8 5.3 88.6 94.4 82.7 94.5 
Decision tree 11.8 4.3 91.0 95.5 86.5 94.6 
C 5.0 16.0 5.8 87.4 93.8 81.0 92.7 
Bayesian net 10.8 7.7 89.8 91.6 87.9 91.8 
Neural 
networks 
11.0 1.9 92.8 98.1 87.5 96.8 
Note: The sample includes 2755 default or non-performing 
loans and a matched sample of 2755 performing loans. Each 
model has been tested by employing same variables used for the 
logistic regression. Type I and Type II error denote false posi-
tive and false negative rejection of hypothesis respectively.  
F-score denotes test model robustness. 1 stands for best value 
measure. PCC stands for Percentage Correctly Classified, 
represents classificatory accuracy of the model. PIC stands for 
Percentage Incorrectly classified, represents classificatory inac-
curacy of the model. Accuracy represents, how well the choice 
model performs better than a naive proportional model. 
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Curram and Minguers (1994) have used decision 
tree based models. Decision trees are powerful and 
popular tools for classification and prediction. The 
fact that decision trees can readily be summarized 
graphically makes them particularly easy to interp-
ret. Decision tree is a rule based classifier predictive 
model, where input transactions are mapped to draw 
conclusion about that set target value. One of the 
most important advantages of decision trees is that 
the inputs can be extracted and represented in the 
form of classification (if-then) rules (Zurada and 
Lonial, 2005). Particularly, it allows the probabili-
ties of classification (perform/ non-perform) to de-
cide the credit approval. However, decision tree can 
be less cognitive and more computational.  
Another model that has recently been popular is 
based on Neural Network (NN) platform. Hui-
Chung (2007) prefers Neural Network based models 
for their predictive accuracy. Contrary to other sta-
tistical methods, Neural Network models do not 
depend on the assumptions, regarding the indepen-
dence and distribution of residuals or collinearity of 
input variables. However, the major drawback of 
Neural Network model is their lack of explanatory 
capability. While they can achieve a high prediction 
accuracy rate, the reasoning behind why and how 
the decision was reached is not available. For exam-
ple, in a case of not accepting a loan or extending an 
existing one, it is almost impossible to determine, 
which input variables are exactly the key ones to 
prompt the rejection of loan. Therefore, it is equally 
difficult to explain the decision results to managers 
based on Neural Network models (Baesens et al., 
2003; Lee and Chen, 2002; West, 2000). Logistic 
regression has widely been used in analyzing the 
risk of default loans due to its interpretative robust-
ness and classificatory accuracy. In addition, logistic 
regression does not require multivariate normality, 
therefore it has less statistical restrictions (Serrano-
Cinca and Gutiérrez-Nieto, 2013). Desai (1996) 
compared Neural Network, logistic regression and 
Discriminant analysis for examining the credit 
risk. He concluded that logistic regression outper-
forms discriminant analysis in classifying bor-
rowers into non-performing or performing groups, 
however Neural Network is almost equally good as 
logistic regression. 
We have compared all the models using our sample 
data. The models are evaluated for their effective-
ness on several measures – Percentage Correctly 
Classified (PCC), Percentage Incorrectly classified 
(PIC), F-Score, Type I and Type II error, F-score 
and model accuracy against a proportional naive 
model (Satchidananda and Simha, 2006). Logistic 
regression outperformed all other models in almost 
all measures. Our result is largely consistent with 
Desai et al. (1996); Barney et al. (1999); and Zurada 
and Lonial (2005). More importantly, we observed 
that the superior performance of the logistic regres-
sion model is due to the fact that optimization of 
linear hyper surface values is either high or low 
(binary classification) has been used in our sample. 
Whereas, other algorithm based models have used 
axis oblique hyper surface (where values can be 
continuous) specification, thus logistic regression 
provides a more robust classificatory accuracy 
contrary to other models, when subjective meas-
ures such as internal explicit knowledge indica-
tors are studied. In addition, we observed that 
each model based on their predictive classifica-
tion can be used to assign a weighted score and 
banks could consider using an average weighted 
score to decide a borrower.  
Discussion and conclusion 
Employing a set of unique measures, known as in-
ternal explicit knowledge, we examined the credit 
risk posed by default or non-performing personal 
loans in Jordanian banks over a period of 1999 to 
2014. Jordanian banks commonly use borrowers’ 
personal and financial information referred as inter-
nal explicit knowledge to assess their credit risk. 
Consistent with the practice of Jordanian banks, we 
examined a portfolio of 2755 default or non-
performing individual loan profiles against a matching 
sample of performing loans. In 2005, the Central Bank 
of Jordan (CBJ) asked the banks to adopt an internal 
credit rating policy to limit the credit risk since de-
faulting became a recurrent issue among them.  
Our findings show several new evidences and cap-
ture the emerging trends of creditworthiness of per-
sonal borrowers and credit risk assessment of Jorda-
nian banks. A judgemental or subjective assessment 
makes quantifying risk a big challenge and com-
bines many disadvantages (Fensterstock, 2005). 
However, our study provides a process to identify 
risky defaulters, which makes risk evaluation expli-
cit, systematic and consistent. The most significant 
offering from our study suggests that the credit risk 
assessment in Jordanian banks need not to rely on 
internal explicit knowledge, rather the proposed 
model is more robust and appropriate for evaluating 
risk of default. This model is capable of improving 
personal lending process in Jordanian banks, mak-
ing it more quantitative, objective and dependable 
instead of using a judgemental-based system as 
practiced. Moreover, this model based on logistic 
iteration is adequately superior compared to other 
credit risk decision models. Characteristically, the 
model is an ideal tool for pre-assessing the potential 
chances of default and specifying creditworthiness 
of personal borrowers. Particularly, classifying the 
different groups of borrowers, based on their profile 
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and running the model with quantifiable results, 
makes the proposed model very effective for Jorda-
nian banking system. 
Our results suggest unemployed borrowers cause 
significant default or contribute significantly to non-
performing loans; whereas, borrowers employed in 
private sectors help lowering the credit risk almost 
twice. We do not find any explicit evidence that 
borrowers from government or public sector have 
any significant impact on credit risk. We suppose 
that the private sector employees are less likely to 
default because of their relatively higher salary. In 
addition, it lends credence to the fact that Jordanian 
private sector employees are seen as safer, since 
they have better insurance provision in place to off-
set any eventuality that may arise from financial 
short-fall or unforeseen ill health. Recently, Jordan 
has introduced a number of measures to provide 
health insurance and offer better social security for 
wider socio-economic classes (Ministry of Planning 
and International Co-operation, 2014). Clearly, this 
trend indicates an emerging market-economy in 
Jordan that reflects the force of impact on social 
renewal of Jordanian financial system and beyond.   
We also find that the new borrowers, banking with 
their bank less than 2 years, are most likely defaulter 
for non-performing loans. Since most of the Jorda-
nian banks are engaged in recruiting a sizable num-
ber of new customers and allowing them relaxed 
loan provisions, the number of new borrowers have 
increased, so as the proportion of non-performing 
loans. This indicates that banking system and finan-
cial intermediaries in Jordan are now open to libera-
lization and embracing more customer-centric ap-
proach. In spite of these measures being counter-
productive, it appears that banks are pursuing such 
measures in anticipation to receive long-term bene-
fits under a reforming economy, as liberalization is 
a relatively new measure in Jordan.  
The low income borrowers, earning less than 999 
JD per month, show a noticeable chances of default, 
whereas; the high income borrowers, i.e. earning 
 
more than 2000 JD per month, are most likely to 
lower the non-performing loans by a substantial 
margin. We also find younger borrowers, age below 
30 years very much increase the probability of de-
fault and senior borrower, over 60 years are less 
likely to default rather significantly lower the prob-
ability of default. Educated borrowers, those have 
achieved at least a degree or master’s qualification 
lower the chances of non-performing loans. In other 
words, here, education implies financial literacy, thus 
borrowers with higher level of education clearly un-
derstand the negative implication of default loan and 
attempt to lower it by adhering to lending regulation. 
Our findings, in a way suggest that education can po-
tentially create sustainable financial system.  
Borrowers taken a loan amount between 10,001 JD 
to 99,000 are very likely to increase the probability 
of default by almost twice. On the contrary, borrow-
ers with smaller loan amounts i.e. less than 10,000 
JD potentially lower the chances of default by re-
ducing non-performing loans. Married borrowers 
are most unlikely to be defaulters.  
Overall, we find that the credit risk caused by de-
fault or non-performing personal loans carries a 
significant impact on Jordanian banking system. 
Although knowledge about borrowers was implicit-
ly present in Jordanian banks, but banks were not 
able to make use of it in a structured and quantifia-
ble way for managing credit risk. Our study finds 
and proposes a robust, quantitative and dependable 
model that can improve the decision making process 
involved with retail lending; thereby, reducing the 
chances of default or non-performing personal 
loans, which inturn, can mitigate credit-risk of Jor-
danian banks.  
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